extensive experience obtained while operating with the Americans would resonate with many future senior officers of the RAN. 8 Whilst the influence of the RN continued to permeate the RAN, the war necessitated that a thorough re-consideration of administration, equipment and outlook be conducted.
Stephen Jurika, Jr., who became US Naval Attaché to Australia in 1947, recalled:
The Australians…could see the decline of Great Britain, its decreasing interest in east Asia, its loss of its Indian empire, the obvious politicization and upcoming independence of all of southeast Asia…So they were looking toward the United States and they made, during my tenure as naval attaché, a number of overtures toward the United States, deliberate overtures, seeking accommodation, which ultimately resulted in the ANZUS pact. 9 The RAN made a clear decision to re-align its navy along the lines of the USN rather than be stymied by their traditional attachment to the RN, which was conveyed to both the Americans and the British. perfectly candid and said that it appeared to them [the Australians] they should use the equipment of the people who would be fighting with them in war which, of course, would be the Americans as we would obviously pull out of Malaya as we had done the last time...In any case they know that in war the Americans will be their main protector and they will do everything they can to please the Americans and pin them down if possible. 10 Two years later, during a visit by an Australian mission to the Pentagon, Sir Percy C.
Spender, Australian Ambassador to the United States, proclaimed: 'The inevitable conclusion is that our destinies are intertwined -if war does break out, our forces will be engaged together. To wait until such a time would be foolhardy and tragic.'
11 Despite the fabric of the RAN being so deeply engrained with RN traditions, the Australians had made a clear decision to change course and focus on the likelihood of working closely with the USN, which in turn, was deemed to require a change in the composition of the fleet and the practices of the navy.
The Influence of Allies
As a smaller navy, which was geographically distant from her traditional allies, the RAN's desire to standardise with a larger partner was understandable. However, it was also essential that the larger navies wished to embrace the Australians. Given the longstanding link between the RAN and the RN, the British aspirations to see the Australians continue to develop their navy along similar lines was perhaps inevitable. That desire was also heightened by force reductions and mounting costs, which caused Britain's First Sea Lord to conclude in 1960 that the 'the R.N. was scaled down to the lowest level at which a reasonably balanced Navy could be maintained and even lacked some equipments which could only be supplied through co-operation with Allied Navies'. 12 British hopes stretched well beyond mere compatibility and the Director of Plans even went as far as to propose an 'integrated Commonwealth each Navy should make a specialised contribution towards a balanced naval force. This would enable each of them to make the best use of its resources by avoiding the wasteful overheads that are at present incurred by each trying to provide itself with a balanced force; and in the result a bigger effective force would be produced from the same total resources. Although it was recognised that a fully integrated Commonwealth fleet 'may be at best a distant aim, or at worst unattainable in full measure', it was believed that the 'pursuit of progressively closer co-operation between these Navies is a realistic -perhaps the only realistic -policy'. The Military Branch deduced that although the Australian Minister for
Defence had 'laid emphasis on the need for Australian armed forces to be able to act independently and, insofar as the ability to co-operate with Allies was concerned, seemed to lean towards co-operation with the U.S. rather than with the U.K', the 'decisions actually taken by the Defence Minister -especially the decision to abolish the Australian F.A.A.
[Fleet Air Arm] -seem to point the other way, at least so far as the R.A.N. is concerned'.
14 Despite British hopes, the RN was ultimately outflanked by the USN. We wish Australia to augment her armaments and to achieve greater weapons compatibility with the United States...In the final analysis our own self-interest should govern, and I submit that it is without doubt to our interest to add to our strength in Far Eastern waters in a manner that is completely standard with the United States Navy.
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The decision to try to enact standardisation with the RAN was not simply a political decision and the USN actively encouraged both their political masters and Australian counterparts to facilitate the process. When Vice Admiral Burrell met with Admiral Arleigh Burke, the Chief of Naval Operations, to discuss the 'possibilities for strengthening the Australian Navy with Untied States Navy vessels and equipment', Admiral Burke made it clear that his position was 'one of wholehearted support for fulfilling any Australian Navy need if at all possible'
and that he was 'not agreeable to letting red tape and secondary considerations stand in the way of meeting these Australian needs if they can be met from existing United States Navy 
Standardisation with the USN: Purchasing the DDGs
The turn towards standardisation with the USN was both drawn out and multi-faceted.
Perhaps no other decision better characterised the shift than the RAN's selection of the American designed and built Charles F. Adams class destroyer as their new type of escort.
The decision was reached for pragmatic financial and practical reasons but compatibility with the USN was also at the forefront of Australian thinking. The initial selection process was far from straightforward, although the options were considerably narrowed through consideration of likely coalition partners. Ultimately, the three realistic candidates were the RN's 6,000 ton we must direct our efforts toward closest association with our allies in all contingencies...I would like to stress with the greatest emphasis I can the importance of this decision that we have made; that is, that our forces should be equipped with modern equipment, standard or compatible with that of the U.S. forces because we recognize quite clearly in any of these contingencies that may occur we will obviously be playing our part in close association with your forces in that area.
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The perceived likelihood of operating with the USN undoubtedly increased the appeal of the Charles F. Adams class destroyer.
There is no indication that the RAN was prepared to sacrifice quality for compatibility and it is perhaps telling that the USN ship was only selected after a rigorous inspection tour, The armament of the ship was also a concern. The County class design included 4.5-inch calibre guns and the Sea Slug surface-to-air missile system, neither of which were favoured by the Australians. 24 Instead, the RAN indicated that they would prefer the 5"/54 calibre guns and Tartar missile system, which were fitted to the Charles F. Adams class.
After an investigation into the feasibility of incorporating those weapon systems in the Logistic considerations further emphasise the desirability of the CHARLES F. ADAMS class as the choice for a new comprehensive escort for the RAN. The large number of this class in service with the USN makes it a reasonable expectation that the logistic requirements for the ships in our forward area of interest will be met in the foreseeable future. In the Australia area, the base spares, training equipment and practice and support facilities which are already provided for three D.D.G.'s will provide basically for the fourth.
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Financial concerns ultimately militated against the acquisition of a fourth destroyer, with
Cabinet rejecting the proposal for a further purchase in 1965. Even so, the reasoning behind the RAN's decision indicated that the move towards American designs was becoming increasingly instinctive. It is understood that the Australian Government's desire to obtain the vessel stems from a well conceived extant program to create a modern missile-age navy tailored to the requirements of Pacific defense and capable of operating in close conjunction with the United States Navy. The ability of the Royal Australian Navy to utilize the vessel effectively and to fulfil the objectives of its modernization is beyond question.
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Put simply, the Americans were 'gratified from a military point of view in having more ships of the same general class in being in the world in the hands of allies'. 36 The acquisition decision was based, in part, on the likelihood of the RAN and USN operating in partnership in the future. That opportunity would arise sooner than either navy may have expected. Australian ships steamed 397,000 miles and fired 102,000 rounds. The contribution of the RAN was numerically minor but in addition to the political value of Australian involvement, the ships were able to make a worthwhile contribution to the naval effort.
Testing the Theory: The RAN at War in Vietnam
In particular, RAN ships achieved distinction through their contribution to the NGS effort. it was assessed as most important to subject the ship and her company to the full USN schedule for shake-down as fixed by the Fleet Training Group, in order to gain a very close understanding of USN drills, operations and procedures in this US designed destroyer.
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The shake-down and work-up periods included dealing with aerial, surface and sub-surface threats. NGS training was a prerequisite and the exercises were conducted with the assistance of United States Army and United States Marine Corps spotters in order to introduce the gun crews to US practices. 46 The shake-down and work-up programmes also devoted significant time to addressing communications, logistics and maintenance issues.
As a Daring class, Vendetta was subjected to a modified programme, which reflected I was also pleased with the sound degree of understanding in the ship of USN procedures which had begun with trials and shakedown. There was resultant potential for a close degree of operational integration to be achieved with the RAN crew in an American-designed DDG.
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The work-up process also provided RAN crews with an insight into likely operations in The physical structure of the ships was merely the platform for co-operation and it proved invaluable for the RAN to work on advancing interoperability with the USN, both before the ships deployed and once they arrived in theatre. In order to accommodate Vendetta's use of atypical ammunition, the Navy Office commissioned the design and production of ammunition pallets to house 4.5" shells on board US supply ships for the purpose of replenishment at sea.
The concurrent utilisation of the Charles F. Adams class destroyers enabled the two navies to develop common procedures for maintenance and repairs. Based on American experiences of barrel wear in Vietnam, the RAN reconsidered their procedure for re-gunning, which resulted in the acceptance of a common process for both navies. Whilst equipment standardisation in peacetime offers the prospect for interoperability in warfare, it is not a foregone conclusion. It was active cooperation between the RAN and USN in relation to the common equipment, which resulted in such a high standard of interoperability.
Interchangeability
In At the same time, it should be noted that standardisation was also marked by an inherent difficulty. Operating the same ships and equipment inevitably made RAN units susceptible to the problems that were experienced by their USN counterparts, which had knock-on effects for the provision of NGS in Vietnam. Most notably, batches of defective equipment and malfunctioning communication technology hampered the performance of vessels from both navies. The quality of 5"/54 cartridges was a constant concern throughout the campaign but never more so than when all firings of that particular type of ammunition were suspended in April 1967. As Hobart was the only RAN vessel in theatre, Australian involvement in offensive naval operations was effectively halted, albeit temporarily.
Interestingly, it was somewhat fortunate that at the peak of the problems with the 5"/54 ammunition, Vendetta was the RAN ship deployed to Vietnam and was able to maximise the use of her 4.5" ammunition. 64 The RAN's reliance on the USN for logistic support to the DDGs ensured that the availability and effectiveness of RAN units were occasionally beyond Australian control.
The Gap Between Standardisation and Interoperability: The Operational Challenges of the Vietnam War
Although the desire to standardise the navies was based on the rational logic of future cooperation, the actual requirements of operating together had been insufficiently considered, which meant a number of challenges had to be addressed during the Vietnam War. An essential element of coalition naval operations, or any military operation for that matter, is the ability of different units to communicate effectively. The incorporation of an RAN ship into the American organisation necessitated immediate and decisive action. Following confirmation that Hobart would be deploying to Vietnam, CINCPAC decreed that:
HMAS HOBART will participate in SEVENTHFLT operations on same basis as US Navy destroyers assigned and will have need to know essentially same information as other destroyer types performing similar functions. It is not desired that operational and administrative type traffic be designated NOFORN simply because HOBART has joined the team.
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As was the case for all USN ships, RAN units received track messages from the unit commander. 66 Access to USN communications was not unfettered and the RAN was only provided access to American communications that were deemed as 'need to know' for operational purposes. In order to facilitate the prompt exchange of information, the classification 'NOFORN EXCEPT AUSTRALIA' was introduced to classify material that was deemed to be releasable to Australia.
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Following authorisation by the USN's Chief of Naval Operations, Hobart was authorised to copy two channels of the US Navy Fleet Radioteletype Broadcast in the Western Pacific, which contained most of the communications traffic that was classified as secret and below. 68 As a result, RAN destroyers were provided with VHF transceivers and additional temporary communication fits. 69 The Vietnam War proved that compatible equipment can be redundant if operational security prohibits connectivity. Although the RAN and USN were operating standardised platforms, the communications fit of the ships differed and American assistance was required to overcome the incompatibilities.
Logistic considerations were also a major concern prior to the commitment of RAN destroyers to Vietnam, which necessitated the production of the 'Logistic and Administrative RAN units so allocated will be fitted, manned, and equipped initially in accordance with applicable policy and directives subject to such modifications as both CHNAVSTAFFRAN and CINCPACFLT subsequently deem necessary to accomplish those missions actually assigned. Such modifications to fitting and equipment, including any resultant equipment additions, will be accomplished from CINCPACFLT resources on either a temporary or permanent basis, as appropriate.
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The Australian Government would reimburse the United States Government for the support provided by the USN, as stipulated by a pre-existing reciprocal agreement between the two nations. 71 The Australians were responsible for the provision of items that were unique to the RAN.
For those items that could not be delivered out at sea, the RAN was able to utilise shore-based replenishments but for all other things, the RAN received underway September 1967, the ship was able to rendezvous with USS Castor twenty-four hours early and even managed to acquire the necessary spare parts to repair the AN/SPS52 radar. 
The Lessons of the RAN's Experience
Although the two obvious markers for the RAN's transition to standardisation with the USN were the decision to purchase the DDGs and their commitment to Vietnam, the intervening period was at least as important. Interoperability at the operational and tactical level does not occur through a process of osmosis simply as a result of purchasing the same platform.
Indeed, the extensive effort exerted by both the RAN and USN to achieve compatibility in all areas, from logistics to training prior to the Australian naval commitment to Vietnam, was essential. Even then, specific operational requirements for action alongside the USN during the Vietnam War necessitated the addition of some new equipment and the modification of existing equipment and procedures. In the case of the DDGs, interoperability was achieved with minimal fuss. HMAS Vendetta posed additional problems but endeavour and goodwill by both parties facilitated efficient cooperation during the Vietnam War. Although it is impossible to say with any certainty, it would appear that if the RAN had deployed more than one Daring class destroyer at any given time or deployed multiple Daring's consecutively, then the logistics problems would have been more cumbersome and perhaps even prohibitive.
In actuality, the deployment of a single Daring ensured that the allowances made by the Seventh Fleet and the efforts of American personnel to obtain a detailed working knowledge of equipment specific to the Australians allowed impromptu work-arounds to prove to be sufficient to maintain a reasonable level of interoperability.
It should be noted that the RAN's acquisition of the DDGs was not without drawbacks. Jones has surmised that the purchase of the DDGs led to the cessation of destroyer construction in Australia, expanded the range of foreign weapon systems in use with the RAN and necessitated the creation of an additional logistic support system that inevitably increased operating costs. 86 The decision to purchase American-designed DDGs created a further short-term problem, which was also experienced by other navies that underwent a similar change in their acquisition policy. In reference to the development of the Indian Navy, G.M. Hiranandani, has declared that although 'the transition from British to Russian acquisitions did manage to succeed,' it did so 'slowly and tortuously to begin with'. 87 The RAN's experience mirrored that of the Indians in terms of temporarily creating a two-tier navy. 88 Jones has outlined:
On one side were the DDGs known as the "tupperware ships" with their crews conversant only in USN procedures but also the considerable jargon needed to crew a US-built ship. On the other side was the rest of the Fleet or the "steel ships". It would be wrong to overemphasise this split, but it was evident. 89 Although these difficulties do not detract from the success of integrating with the USN during the Vietnam War, they do clearly indicate that significant divergences in acquisition policy predictably create teething problems.
While smaller navies will inevitably strive for independence, there are also widespread benefits to emulating the model of effective larger navies. Tom Frame has contended:
Although the RAN had been created by royal decree in 1911, its customs, traditions and ethos were those of the parent navy from which it had been grafted. In the RAN's formative years, replicating the most powerful navy in the world made good sense. In British eyes, Australian success would be determined by the faithfulness of the copy. There can be no doubt that the purchase of the Charles F. Adams class destroyers was a watershed moment for the RAN. Although the RN and USN had actively tried to promote standardisation with the RAN, the purchase of American designed and built ships delineated between a navy moulded on the British model and an increasingly independent service aimed at compatibility with the US. Indeed, while the RAN actively sought greater independence, the Australians were cognisant that future operations, both within their own region and beyond, were likely to be undertaken in partnership with the USN. Arguably, the Australians were vindicated by the fact the DDGs saw service with the USN in Vietnam and HMAS
Brisbane went on to serve alongside the USN during the Gulf War.
